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Abstract 
We examine the characteristics of firms that lobbied on the 2010 Exposure Draft (ED) on 
pensions and find that signalling influences the decision to lobby. Further, we examine 
preparer’s position to two important proposals in the ED. We find that preparers are less 
likely to agree with the abolition of the corridor when they report unrecognized actuarial 
losses and that firms are more likely to oppose the replacement of the expected rate of return 
with the discount rate when the spread between these two rates is large. These results suggest 
that while signalling drives firm decisions to lobby, self-interest influences how firms lobby.   






IAS 19 ‘Employee Benefits’ has been heavily criticised due to the fact that it did not 
accurately portray the financial position of firms sponsoring defined benefit pension plans. In 
response to these criticisms, the IASB issued a Discussion Paper in March 2008 ‘Preliminary 
views on amendments to IAS 19 employee benefits’ and an Exposure Draft ‘Defined benefit 
plans: Proposed amendments to IAS 19’ in April 2010, which culminated to the introduction 
of IAS 19(R) in June 2011. The most important proposed changes in the Exposure Draft 
focused on two main issues: (a) the abolition of the corridor method when recognizing 
actuarial gains or losses and (b) the replacement of the expected rate of return on pension 
plan assets with the discount rate when computing pension expense. 
We examine the incentives underlying a firm’s decision to submit a comment letter on 
the 2010 pensions Exposure Draft as well as the factors influencing their decision to agree 
(oppose) to the proposals to abolish the use of the corridor approach and the  replacement of 
the expected rate of return on pension plan assets with the discount rate. In particular, we 
hypothesize that signalling and self-interest influence a firm’s decision to lobby. We also 
study whether firms reporting large unrecognized gains or losses are more likely to oppose 
the abolition of the corridor to avoid the introduction of balance sheet volatility. Moreover, 
we hypothesize that firms with a large spread between the expected rate of return on plan 
assets and the discount rate are less likely to support the replacement of the expected rate of 
return on plan assets with the discount rate as this will likely increase pension expense. We 
also expect firms with large unrecognized gains or losses to oppose the replacement of the 
expected rate of return on plan assets with the discount rate given that differences between 
the discount rate and the actual return on assets will be recognized in other comprehensive 
income (OCI), which will increase OCI volatility.  
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We find that signalling, as captured by pension fund size and the number of shares 
available for trading positively influences the likelihood of firms submitting a comment 
letter. When analyzing firm responses to the proposal to abolish the corridor, we find that 
unrecognized net actuarial losses are associated with a lower likelihood that submitters agree 
with the removal of the corridor. Similarly, firms with more dispersed ownership and thus 
possibly greater information asymmetry between management and shareholders are also less 
likely to agree with the removal of the corridor. The analysis examining the likelihood that 
firms will agree with the replacement of the expected rate of return on plan assets with the 
discount rate suggests that the larger the spread between the expected rate of return on plan 
assets and the discount rate the less likely is that firms will agree with the proposal, even 
though the coefficient is marginally significant. 
Examining the comment letters submitted in the context of the 2010 Exposure Draft 
on pensions is interesting as the proposed changes have an impact on (a) the calculation and 
recognition of pension expense and the (b) recognition of actuarial gains or losses for which 
there was heterogeneity in their treatment under the previous accounting standard IAS 19. In 
particular, with respect to the first point the proposed changes will have an impact on the 
expected return on pension plan assets calculation as the proposal suggests replacing the 
expected rate of return with the discount rate and thus they will have an impact on reported 
profits. In addition, with respect to the second point, the proposed changes require 
recognition of unrealized gains or losses in other comprehensive income whereas under IAS 
19 firms had a choice to either recognize these in other comprehensive income, in the income 
statement or keep them off-balance sheet and amortize them if the corridor threshold was 
triggered. This proposed change will have an impact on balance sheet volatility. Hence, our 
paper combines the approach adopted by studies which focus on examining lobbying 
behavior in the context of proposed changes in accounting for items that will be recognized in 
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the financial statements (e.g.,  Deakin, 1989; Francis, 1987; Ramanna, 2008) as well as 
studies that focus on the recognition of previously disclosed items (Fried, 2012).  
This study adds to extant literature studying firm characteristics of companies that 
participate in the accounting standard-setting due process. In particular, it seeks to add to the 
relatively limited literature which studies lobbying within the IASB standard-setting context. 
This study is to our knowledge the first one that attempts to identify the firm characteristics 
driving the decision to submit a comment letter to the 2010 ‘Employee Benefits’ Exposure 
Draft, which arguably introduced some of the most significant changes in pension 
accounting, and that seeks to identify the firm characteristics that influence how firms 
respond to proposals in the Exposure Draft.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of 
pension accounting standard-setting while Section 3 selectively reviews relevant prior 
literature and develops the hypotheses to be tested in this study. Section 4 presents the 
research design, Section 5 discusses the empirical analysis and Section 6 concludes. 
2. Overview of pension accounting standard-setting 
2.1. Accounting for pensions under IAS 19 
The multitude of options available when recognizing changes in pension assets and 
liabilities under IAS 19 as well as the flexibility inherent in the choice of the expected rate of 
return on pension plan assets resulted in lack of transparency and comparability. In particular, 
firms in different European countries and sometimes firms within the same country opted for 
different methods when recognizing actuarial gains or losses (Fasshauer, Glaum, & Street, 
2008a, 2008b; Morais, 2010). In addition, the choice of expected rates of return has attracted 
considerable attention and there is some empirical evidence that managers set this actuarial 
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assumption opportunistically both in the UK and the US context (e.g., Asthana, 2008; 
Bergstresser, Desai, & Rauh, 2006; Li & Klumpes, 2013). 
Following concerns that the accounting model underlying IAS 19 was inadequate, the 
International Accounting Standards Board issued a Discussion Paper in March 2008, which 
was developed in consultation with the IASB’s Employee Benefits Working Group, entitled 
‘Preliminary views on amendments to IAS 19 employee benefits’. The main reasons for 
issuing the Discussion Paper rested on both preparers’ and users’ views that existing pension 
accounting requirements led to lack of transparency about pension promises (IASB, 2008). 
Following consideration of the responses to the Discussion Paper, the IASB subsequently 
issued an Exposure Draft entitled ‘Defined benefit plans: Proposed amendments to IAS 19’ in 
April 2010. Table 1 shows the timeline which led to the ultimate publication of IAS 19(R) in 
June 2011, while the following subsection discusses the main amendments proposed in the 
Exposure Draft that are relevant to this study. 
 
<<Insert Table 1 around here>> 
 
2.2. IASB Exposure Draft on pension accounting ‘Defined benefit plans: Proposed 
amendments to IAS 19’ 
The Exposure Draft discussed issues relating to recognition and presentation of 
pension-related numbers, disaggregation and disclosures (IASB, 2010). Our study focuses on 
two important issues raised in the Exposure Draft concerning recognition and disaggregation. 
More specifically, consistent with the proposals in the Discussion Paper, the Exposure Draft 
proposes the abolition of the corridor and the recognition of the net asset or liability in the 
balance sheet with the changes in projected benefit obligations and pension plan assets being 
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recognized in other comprehensive income.
1
 The Board believed that this is an improvement 
to pension accounting as the pension-related items to be recognized in the balance sheet and 
in other comprehensive income will be both relevant and easier for users to understand. In 
contrast, deferred recognition, which was allowed under IAS 19 resulted in misleading 
reported numbers as a net pension asset could be recognized in the balance sheet even when 
the pension plan was in deficit; in addition, gains or losses that relate to previous periods 
were reported in other comprehensive income (IASB, 2010). Hence, the proposed 
amendment is purported to provide a more faithful representation of pension obligations. 
Further, given that the proposed amendments eliminate the options for recognizing actuarial 
gains or losses under IAS 19, this amendment is believed to enhance comparability of 
pension-related numbers.  
Critics to the proposal noted that until the measurement model is reviewed, the 
corridor approach should be used on the basis that it reflects the long-term nature of the 
pension obligation. In addition, opponents noted that some of the changes to the pension 
liability during the period are not pertinent to the measurement of the long-term liability as 
actuarial gains or losses in one period may be offset by future actuarial gains or losses. Critics 
also argued that the ensuing volatility from immediately recognizing actuarial gains or losses 
would hinder comparability over time and would make the profitability measure more 
opaque. Moreover, the increased volatility would increase the risk of breaching existing debt 
covenants and restrict the firm’s ability to pay dividends.  
The Exposure Draft also proposed the replacement of the expected rate of return on 
pension plan assets, used in computing the returns on the pension portfolio, with the net 
interest cost on the net pension asset or liability. The net interest cost would be computed by 
                                                            
1 Under IAS 19, firms had three options when recognizing changes in pension assets and liabilities: (a) they 
could recognize these in other comprehensive income, (b) in the income statement or (c) keep them off-balance 
sheet and amortize them only if the corridor threshold (i.e., 10% of the greater of pension plan assets or pension 
liabilities) was triggered. 
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multiplying the net pension asset or liability throughout the period by the interest rate on high 
quality corporate bonds. Hence, under this approach a company would recognize interest 
income when the pension plan is in surplus and interest cost when the plan is in deficit. 
Critics to the proposed approach argued that even though a deficit or surplus would be 
recognized in the balance sheet, deficits and surpluses have different economic drivers, 
different explicit or implicit discount rates and are measured on a different basis. While the 
Board acknowledges the limitation inherent in the proposed approach, using the same 
discount rate to compute the return on plan assets as that used to calculate the present value 
of pension obligations is practical as it will not involve subjective judgements about 
decomposing the return on plan assets into an interest component and a remeasurement 
component. In addition, the amounts recognized in profit and loss under the proposed 
approach would better reflect differences between funded and unfunded plans. It should also 
be noted that differences between the actual return on plan assets and net interest income 
would not be recognized in profit or loss, but rather in other comprehensive income. 
 
3. Prior literature and hypotheses development 
The perceived costs and benefits of proposed new accounting standards likely 
influence the likelihood of various stakeholders’ participation in the standard-setting process 
by submitting a comment letter on the Exposure Draft. This view is consistent with the 
positive accounting theory developed by Watts and Zimmerman (1986) and suggests that the 
benefits of lobbying are influenced by the impact of the accounting proposals on the expected 
future cash flow of companies. In this respect, when deciding whether or not to submit a 
comment letter, submitters give consideration to the impact of the proposed changes on 
reported accounting numbers, the signalling effect the submission of a comment letter might 
have on various stakeholders, as well as the costs involved in gathering and producing the 
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required information. Although there is abundant literature on lobbying of accounting 
standard setters in the US setting, the literature on the role of lobbying in the IASB standard- 
setting process is less studied. Given the focus of our study, the discussion of extant prior 
literature will review studies on lobbying within the context of the IASB standard-setting 
process and those which examine pension-related standards.  
Jorissen, Lybaert, Orens, and Van Der Tas (2010) examine the incentives of various 
stakeholders to participate in the standard-setting process and find that preparers of accounts 
as well as accountants and standard setters are more likely to be involved in the standard-
setting process when the proposed changes are anticipated to have a significant impact on the 
accounting numbers reported by companies. They also find that preparers participating in the 
IASB’s due process are typically larger and more profitable.2,3 Larson (1997) examines the 
characteristics of companies that lobby the IASC and sheds light on the extent to which US-
based lobbying theories are relevant in the international context. The study finds that 
lobbying firms (US and firms from other countries) were larger compared to non-lobbying 
firms in terms of revenue, income and assets. In addition, the majority of lobbying 
corporations were listed on at least one foreign stock exchange and the majority of non-US 
lobbying companies traded in the US. Overall, the paper provides support for the 
applicability of US-based theories in the international context.   
                                                            
2 Using a questionnaire survey, Georgiou (2010) examines the perceptions of and participation in the IASB 
process of a sample of investment management firms and finds that participation is higher than reflected in the 
public record of comment letters as many firms express their views through representative organizations such as 
the Investment Management Association. In addition, the cost of lobbying is found to be the most important 
factor explaining non-participation in the lobbying process. 
3 Georgiou (2002) examines the reasons why a sample of U.K. firms decided not to make a submission on the 
ASB’s discussion paper on deferred tax. He finds that firm perceptions that their participation would not 
influence the outcome of the standard-setting process as well as their belief that auditors would represent their 
position explained their decision not to submit a comment letter. Further, the results are not consistent with the 
notion that agreement with the proposals in the ASB’s Discussion Paper is more likely to result in a non-
response than disagreement with the proposals.   
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Apart from examining the characteristics of firms that decided to lobby, prior 
literature also examines the incentives influencing the decision to lobby the accounting 
standard-setting bodies on specific standard-setting issues. In particular within the pensions 
context, Francis (1987) examines firms’ lobbying against the FASB’s 1982 proposals on 
pension accounting which (a) suggested the recognition of the funded status of the pension 
plan in the balance sheet, (b) constrained flexibility when determining pension expense and 
(c) gave rise to volatility due to the way that pension expense would be determined. The 
paper finds that firm size as well as the adverse impact on reported numbers explained the 
decision to lobby. Kreuze, Langsam, and Newell (1993) examine the relationship between the 
proposals included in the Exposure Draft of Statement 106, ‘Employer’s accounting for 
postretirement benefits other than pensions’ and the final standard and the views expressed in 
the comment letters submitted to the Exposure Draft. They find that the issues that were 
partly or wholly modified in the final standard were strongly opposed by the majority of 
comment letter submitters. In addition, they find that none of the issues with which 
respondents agreed were modified. More recently, Fried (2012) examines the lobbying 
behavior of firms in response to SFAS No.158 Exposure Draft on pensions in the US, which 
proposes the recognition of the (disclosed under the accounting standard prevailing at the 
time) funded status in the balance sheet. He finds that firms that opposed recognition had 
large underfunded plans and the magnitude of the balanced sheet adjustments under the 
proposed changes explained their opposition to the amendments in the Exposure Draft. 
Building on prior studies, this study seeks to add to the literature studying lobbying 
behavior within the IASB standard-setting process. In particular, this paper seeks to fill the 
lacuna in extant prior literature where even though lobbying to a proposed pension 
accounting standard has been studied in a US setting, no research has yet explained the 
drivers of lobbying behavior to a pensions accounting standard within an IASB context. 
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Given the different institutional setting and proposed amendments, different firm 
characteristics to those identified in Francis (1987) and Fried (2012) may have driven 
submitters to lobby the IASB. Hence, this study contributes to our understanding of lobbying 
behavior in an international context. Moreover, in this study we seek to shed light on both the 
factors that drive firms to submit a comment letter as well as the factors that influence how 
submitters lobby to two critical proposals in the 2010 Exposure Draft. Preparers of financial 
statements constituted one of the most active groups and given the importance of pensions as 
well as the materiality of pension-related numbers for companies, examining preparer’s 
responses to the proposals is interesting and topical. Even though the use of comment letters 
is merely one of the ways to lobby, prior research suggests that it is a good proxy for 
lobbying behavior (Georgiou, 2004) and represents ‘one of the most reliable forms of 
evidence for lobbying studies’ (Asekomeh, Russell, & Tarbert, 2006, p. 57). 
We first examine the factors underlying firms’ decisions to respond to the 2010 
Exposure Draft on pensions. In particular, we shed light on the determinants of firms’ 
decision to submit a comment letter by examining firm and pension-specific characteristics. 
We attempt to identify whether signalling and / or self-interest drives the decision to submit a 
comment letter. Signalling is linked to impression management whereby the firm acts to 
influence stakeholder impressions of the firm; and self-interest is the direct result of the 
Exposure Draft proposals’ perceived influence on reported numbers. In this context, our first 
set of hypotheses are: 
H1A: The larger the perceived signalling effect of submitting a comment letter, the 
more likely it is that the firm will submit a comment letter. 
 
H1B: The larger the perceived cost of implementing the proposals in the Exposure 
Draft, the more likely it is that the firm will submit a comment letter. 
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We also examine the factors underlying firms’ decisions to agree or oppose the 
abolition of the corridor and the replacement of the expected rate of return on pension plan 
assets with the net interest cost. The proposed abolition of the corridor and the requirement to 
recognize the net pension asset or liability in the balance sheet and changes in pension assets 
and liabilities immediately in other comprehensive income will improve comparability and is 
purported to faithfully represent events and transactions (IASB, 2010). However, the removal 
of this smoothing mechanism will restrict the deferred recognition of actuarial gains or losses 
and introduce volatility (Ernst & Young, 2011).  Hence, we would expect firms with 
unrecognized losses and firms with greater information asymmetry between shareholders and 
management,
4
 such as firms with more dispersed ownership, to be more likely to oppose the 
abolition of the corridor, which leads to our second set of hypotheses: 
H2A: Firms with large unrecognized losses are more likely to oppose the abolition 
of the corridor approach. 
 
H2B:  Firms with a high degree of dispersed ownership are more likely to oppose 
the abolition of the corridor approach.  
 
Further, the proposed abolition of the expected rate of return on pension plan assets 
and its replacement with the discount rate when computing pension expense implies that the 
expected return on assets under the proposed change (which is a component of net interest 
cost) will not reflect the returns expected on the pension portfolio. Indeed, the main reason 
provided by respondents in the comment letters opposing the utilization of the discount rate is 
                                                            
4 The information asymmetry between shareholders and management is driven by a principal-agent conflict 
where the principal (shareholders) have less information than the agent (management) as to how the company is 
being managed. Such conflict enables management to take advantage of the information asymmetry and 
possibly act to the detriment of shareholders, such as in this case by hiding the true magnitude of unrecognized 




that it will not reflect the composition of the pension portfolio, which also includes equities 
and other risky investments. Further, the abolition of the expected rate of return on pension 
plan assets will constrain manager’s ability to use this actuarial assumption in order to 
manage earnings. Prior literature provides evidence that managers exercise their flexibility 
over the expected rate of return on plan assets with a view to improving reported earnings 
(Asthana, 2008; Bergstresser et al., 2006; Li & Klumpes, 2013). This leads to the third 
hypothesis: 
H3:   Firms with a wide spread between the expected rate of return and the discount 
rate are less likely to support the replacement of the expected rate of return 
on pension plan assets with the discount rate. 
 
4. Research Design 
4.1. Sample 
4.1.1. Submitter group 
Following the publication of the Exposure Draft ‘Employee Benefits’, 227 comment 
letters were submitted by various stakeholder groups.
5
  As evident from Fig. 1, the majority 
of comment letters were submitted by Industrial firms (28%, N=63), while the lowest number 
of comment letters were submitted by Academics (1%, N=3). Equal number of comment 
letters (16%, N=36) were submitted by Accounting firms
6
 and Financial institutions.
7
 Two 
other important stakeholder groups, which submitted comment letters were Actuaries (15%, 
N=33) and Accounting standard setters (7%, N=17). 
 
                                                            
5 These are publicly available on the IASB’s website. 
6 The category ‘Accounting’ firms also includes professional accounting associations such as the ICAEW. 
7 The category ‘Financial institutions’ includes both banking and insurance institutions. 
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<<Insert Figure 1 around here>> 
Even though both Financial institutions and Industrial firms may be classified as 
preparers we chose to focus our study on Industrial firms. This is due to the fact that the 
submission and content of comment letters submitted by Financial institutions may be driven 
by their client firm characteristics and it is difficult to disentangle the influence of such 
characteristics from the influence of the particular financial institution’s own characteristics.8 
Hence, our submitter population consists of 63 Industrial firms (vide Table 2), two of which 
are government-owned entities (Hydro-Quebec and Canada Post Corporation) and one firm 
which is a wholly owned subsidiary of another company, which itself has submitted a 
comment letter.
9
 Other firms were dropped due to limited data availability, thus our final 
submitter group consists of 54 firms. 
<<Insert Table 2 around here>> 
4.1.2. Control group 
To address our first set of hypotheses and shed light on the firm-level characteristics, 
which may influence the likelihood that a company will submit a comment letter, we 
augment our submitter group with a control group of firms. Given that we want to identify 
the factors influencing the likelihood of submitting a comment letter and that it is ex-ante 
unclear which characteristics influence the submission of comment letters, we adopt a many-
to-one approach when choosing our control group. In this context, we first identify the market 
                                                            
8 A similar argument can be made in the case of firms classified as Industrials; however, it is likely that the 
influence of clients in the comment letters submitted by such firms is negligible. Notwithstanding this, the 
influence of client characteristics in the choice of whether to submit a comment letter and in the content of such 
a comment letter will work against us finding a statistically significant association between firm-level 
characteristics and the submission/content of comment letters. 
9 Telefonos de Mexico S.A.B de C.V. (Telmex) is a wholly owned subsidiary of America Movil and this firm 
also submitted a comment letter. 
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in which submitter group firms are listed and then use the Datastream-Market indices 
constituents for the submitter markets to identify firms for our control group. 
The majority of submitter group firms are listed on either the U.S. (36.67%) or the 
U.K. (21.67%) stock markets. These are followed by the German (8.33%), Swiss (6.67%), 
Indian (5%), Canadian (3.33%) and French (3.33%) stock markets. As shown in Table 3, 
there are 9 other stock markets represented by one submitter firm. Our control group consists 
of the Datastream Market index
10
 constituents for these markets. This amounts to 3,208 firms, 
which due to the data requirements discussed in the next section drop to 1,348 firms. 
<<Insert Table 3 around here>> 
4.2. Variables  
4.2.1. Dependent variables 
We test all hypotheses using probit regressions where the dependent variable is a 
binary variable taking the values of either 1 or 0. In particular, we created a variable SUB, 
which takes the value of 1 if the firm has submitted a comment letter and 0 otherwise to test 
the first set of hypotheses relating to the identification of firm characteristics that distinguish 
submitters from non-submitters. 
To test H2 and H3 relating to the factors influencing the comment letter response to 
questions 1 and 5 of the Exposure Draft, we classify each comment letter according to 
whether it shows agreement with the relevant proposal in the Exposure Draft. We adopt the 
following process when classifying comment letters: first, each comment letter was 
thoroughly read independently by each author and a classification schedule was developed by 
                                                            
10 Datastream-Market indices are calculated on a representative list of stocks for each market, where the number 




each author based upon the responses provided to questions 1 and 5 in the Exposure Draft. 
We classified comment letters as either in agreement or in disagreement with the proposals 
for the abolition of the corridor and the expected rate of return on pension plan assets 
proposed in the Exposure Draft. Instances of conditional agreement with a proposal were 
classified as being in disagreement with the question given that respondents did not 
completely agree with the proposed changes in these instances. Using only two groupings 
allows us to simplify the comment letter classification process, while ensuring that we retain 
sufficient statistical power to conduct the analysis. Subsequently, the classification schedules 
of each author were compared and the Cohen’s Kappa coefficient was computed. As shown 
in Table 4, for both questions the percentage level of agreement between both authors was 
over 90% and the Cohen’s Kappa coefficient indicates a high level of agreement between the 
two authors. The small number of comment letters on which there was disagreement on their 
classification were discussed by the co-authors and a final classification was subsequently 
agreed upon by both co-authors. 
<<Insert Table 4 around here>> 
Not all 63 submitters answered both questions of interest. In this regard, 53 submitters 
answered Q1, while 59 submitters answered Q5. Fig. 2, shows submitter reaction to the two 
questions of interest. While 58% of the submitters who answered Q1 agreed with the removal 
of the corridor approach, the vast majority of submitters answering Q5 (85%) disagreed with 
the abolition of the expected rate of return on plan assets. Based on the answers to these two 
questions, two binary variables, Q1_AGREE and Q5_AGREE taking the value of 1 if 
respondents agreed with the respective proposal and 0 otherwise, were constructed.  
 
<<Insert Figure 2 around here>> 
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4.2.2 Independent variables 
In the first set of hypotheses (H1), we posit that there are two dimensions that 
influence the likelihood that a preparer will submit a comment letter. One dimension is the 
signalling effect of submitting a comment letter and the second is self-interest. Given that the 
benefit of managing how a firm is perceived is possibly greater the larger its pension plan and 
the more dispersed its ownership, we use variables F-SIZE and FREEFLOAT as our two 
proxies for IMAGE when testing for the signalling effect. F-SIZE is calculated as the 
logarithmic transformation of the fair values of pension plan assets, while FREEFLOAT is 
calculated as the percentage number of shares available for trading (i.e., excluding strategic 
holdings). 
The self-interest dimension is the result of the perceived impact of the proposals in the 
Exposure Draft on the firm. Given that the proposals in Q1 and Q5 were the most 
controversial and elicited the most debate, we include in our model proxies capturing the 
degree of impact these proposals would have on firms. Given that as discussed in Section 3, 
firms with wide spreads between the expected rate of return on pension plan assets and the 
discount rate and firms with unrecognized net actuarial losses are likely to be most affected 
by the proposals, we include variables SPR and UNR-LOSS in our model. SPR is the 
difference between the expected rate of return on pension plan assets and discount rates,
11
 
while UNR-LOSS is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the firm has 
unrecognized net actuarial losses and 0 otherwise.  
We control for a number of factors which may influence our results. These are: SIZE, 
computed as the logarithmic transformation of total assets; FS, funding status, computed as 
the fair value of pension plan assets scaled by projected pension benefit obligations; LEV, 
                                                            
11 All results are robust to the scaling of SPR by the expected rate of return. 
17 
 
leverage, calculated as total debt scaled by total shareholders’ equity; ROA, return on assets, 
computed as EBITDA scaled by total assets. When testing the second and third set of 
hypotheses, we also control for the percentage of pension plan assets invested in equities 
(EQUITY) given that pension plan asset allocation may influence how firms lobby to the 
different proposals. Further, we include two dummy variables, IFRS and USGAAP, which 
take the value of 1 if the firm follows IFRS and USGAAP respectively, and 0 otherwise. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% level and were computed from data 
extracted from Datastream for financial year 2009, the year before the publication of the 
Exposure Draft. 
5. Empirical analysis 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics for the independent variables used in the 
analysis for the whole sample (i.e., including both submitter and control firms). The submitter 
group consists of larger firms with larger pension plans compared to the control group. The 
mean (median) F-SIZE for the submitter group is 15.45 (15.75) while the mean (median) for 
the control group is 12.28 (12.49). Moreover, the submitter group has a larger FREEFLOAT, 
0.91 (0.94) than control group firms, 0.73 (0.82). Firms in the submitter group have larger 
SPR and a lower proportion of submitter firms have unrecognized net actuarial losses (UNR-
LOSS). In particular, the mean (median) SPR for submitter group firms is 1.39 (1.38) and the 
SPR for control group firms is 0.84 (0.85). Conversely, a larger proportion of control firms 
(23%) have unrecognized net actuarial losses than submitter group firms (13%) 
  
<<Insert Table 5 about here>> 
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To assess whether the differences between the submitter and control groups are 
statistically significant, we conduct independent t-tests for difference in means. The results 
reported in Table 6 suggest that the differences between the two groups for the variables of 
interest are all statistically significant. In particular, differences in F-SIZE, FREEFLOAT and 
SPR are statistically significant at the 1% level, while the difference between the two groups 
for UNR-LOSS is marginally statistically significant at the 10% level. 
<<Insert Table 6 about here>> 
Table 7 presents the Pearson correlation matrix for the independent variables. As 
expected, we find a positive and significant correlation between SIZE and F-SIZE, suggesting 
that larger firms have larger pension plans, and a negative significant correlation between the 
two dummy variables USGAAP and IFRS, suggesting that most sampled firms use either 
USGAAP or IFRSs. Interestingly, we find a positive and significant correlation between 
USGAAP and SPR, possibly driven by U.S. firms in the sample whose pension plan assets 
tend to be more weighted towards equities. Such firms will use higher expected rates of 
return on pension plan assets, compared to firms that invest heavily in bonds, thus increasing 
the spread between expected rates of return and discount rates.  
<<Insert Table 7 around here>> 
5.2 Testing H1 
To test our first set of hypotheses, we use the following probit model: 
Pr (𝑆𝑈𝐵 = 1) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽2𝐹 − 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑇 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑃𝑅 + 𝛽5𝑈𝑁𝑅




In line with H1A, which posits that signalling is one of the drivers influencing the 
likelihood that a firm submits a comment letter, ex-ante we expect to find a statistically 
significant positive association between our proxies for signalling, F-SIZE and 
FREEFLOAT, and the probability the firm submits a comment letter. Further, given that as 
per H1B, self-interest is expected to influence the submission of a comment letter, we 
hypothesize that SPR and UNR-LOSS are positively related with our dependent variable. 
The results for Model 1, together with the relevant marginal effects are reported in 
Table 8. Consistent with H1A, we find that signalling is the main factor influencing the 
submission of a comment letter. In this regard, both proxies for signalling, F-SIZE and 
FREEFLOAT, are statistically significant in the expected direction, while the proxies for self-
interest (i.e., SPR and UNR-LOSS) are insignificant. This result suggests that the decision 
about whether to submit a comment letter is primarily driven not by the possible impact the 
Exposure Draft proposals may have on the company, but from the need of the company to 
manage stakeholder perceptions. Hence, it is possible that the same firms might regularly 
submit comment letters in order to signal to their stakeholders that they take an active part in 
the standard-setting due process. 
<<Insert Table 8 around here>> 
5.3 Testing H2 
To test the second set of hypotheses, we drop from our sample submitters that did not 
answer Q1. Q1 was answered by 53 out of the 63 submitters (vide Fig. 2); however, the 
required data is only available for 46 of these firms. Moreover, we amend Model (1), so that 
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our dependent variable is Q1_AGREE
12
 and include EQUITY, the percentage of pension 
plan assets allocated to equity, in our vector of control variables.  
Table 9 reports the results. In line with H2A, we find that the existence of 
unrecognized net actuarial losses is statistically significantly associated (at the 5% level) with 
a lower probability of submitter agreement with the removal of the corridor approach. This 
result is driven by the fact that the removal of the corridor approach is likely to be most costly 
for firms with unrecognized net actuarial losses. With the removal of the corridor approach, 
such firms will have to recognize any actuarial losses immediately in other comprehensive 
income, which will give rise to volatility. 
We also find a strong positive association significant at the 1% level between 
FREEFLOAT and the dependent variable, suggesting that firms with more dispersed 
ownership are less likely to agree with the removal of the corridor approach. Dispersed 
ownership will more likely result in greater information asymmetry between shareholders and 
management, thus enabling companies with dispersed ownership to take advantage of the 
smoothing effect of the corridor approach.  
<<Insert Table 9 around here>> 
5.4 Testing H3 
To test H3, we drop from our main sample firms that did not answer Q5. There were 
59 submitters which answered Q5; however, we drop 9 of these firms from the analysis due 
to data limitations. Q5 proposed the use of the discount rate instead of the expected rate of 
return to calculate the expected income from pension plan assets. In this analysis the 
dependent variable, Q5_AGREE, takes the value of 1 if a submitter agrees with the removal 
                                                            
12 Q1_AGREE takes the value of 1 if the submitter agrees with the proposal (i.e., the abolition of the corridor 
approach) set out in Q1, and 0 otherwise. 
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of the expected rate of return and 0 otherwise. Table 10 reports the results. Consistent with 
H3, we find that SPR is marginally negatively associated with the probability of agreement 
with Q5. Thus, submitters with wider spreads between the expected rate of return on pension 
plan assets and discount rates are less likely to agree with the replacement of the expected 
rate of return with the discount rate.  
<<Insert Table 10 around here>> 
6. Concluding remarks 
We examine the characteristics of firms that submitted comment letters to the 2010 
Exposure Draft on pensions. In addition, we examine the incentives underlying firm decisions 
to oppose two controversial proposals in the Exposure Draft: the abolition of the corridor 
method when recognizing actuarial gains or losses and the replacement of the expected rate 
of return on plan assets with the discount rate when computing pension expense. We find that 
signalling as captured by both pension plan size and percentage of shares available for trading 
influence the decision to lobby. When analysing firm’s positions to the abolition of the 
corridor approach, we find that firms with unrecognized net actuarial losses are less likely to 
agree with the removal of the corridor. Further, when analysing firm responses to the 
replacement of the expected rate of return on plan assets with the discount rate, we find some 
evidence that firms with wider spreads between the expected rate of return on plan assets and 
the discount rate are less likely to agree with the proposal.  
Using comment letters to examine the hypothesized relationships is appropriate given 
that they reflect the views of the preparers who chose to submit a comment letter. However, 
we acknowledge that our study suffers from the sampling issues that are relevant to other 
studies in this area, in that we are only able to analyse the views of companies that responded 
to the Exposure Draft (Asekomeh et al., 2006). Overall, the results suggest that the impact of 
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the proposed changes on reported numbers, such as increased volatility and decrease in 
earnings, influences preparer’s position to these two important proposals in the pensions 
Exposure Draft. Future research can examine the impact of the revised accounting standard 
IAS 19(R) (IASB, 2011) , which abolished the corridor and replaced the expected rate of 






In this study, we examine the firm characteristics, which motivate firms to lobby by 
submitting a comment letter and the firm characteristics which drive their responses to two 
important proposals in the 2010 ‘Employee benefits’ Exposure Draft. The two questions 
studied were questions 1 and 5 in the Exposure Draft. 
 
Question 1 
Question 1 related to recognition: “The Exposure Draft proposes that entities should 
recognize all changes in the present value of the defined benefit obligation and in the fair 
value of plan assets when they occur (Paragraphs 54, 61 and BC9-BC12). Do you agree? 
Why or why not?” 
 
Question 5 
Question 5 related to defining the finance cost component: “The Exposure Draft proposes 
that the finance cost component should comprise net interest on the net defined benefit 
liability (asset). As a consequence, it eliminates from IAS 19 the requirement to present an 
expected return on plan assets in profit or loss. Should net interest on the net defined benefit 
liability (asset) be determined by applying the discount rate specified in paragraph 78 to the 
net defined benefit liability (asset)? Why or why not? If not, how would you define the 
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Figure 2: This figure presents a bar chart illustrating percentage agreement with the proposals set out 
in questions 1 (Q1) and 5 (Q5) of the Exposure Draft. Not all 63 preparer submitters answered all 
questions set out in the Exposure Draft. Q1 was answered by 53 submitters, while Q5 was answered 






















Table 1 List of key dates in the publication of IAS 19(R) ‘Employee Benefits’. 
Date Details 
01 March 2008 Discussion paper 'Preliminary views on amendments to IAS 19 Employee 
Benefits' published. 
29 April 2010 
Exposure Draft ED/2010/3 ‘Defined Benefit Plans – Proposed amendments to 
IAS 19’ published.  
6 September 2010 
Deadline of Exposure Draft ED/2010/3 Defined Benefit Plans – Proposed 
Amendments to IAS 19 comment period. 
16 June 2011 IAS19R ‘Employee Benefits’ issued. 








Table 2 Details of the constituents of the Industrial submitter group. Telefonos de Mexico S.A.B de C.V. (Telmex) is a wholly owned 
subsidiary of America Movil, a firm that also submitted a comment letter, while both Hydro-Quebec and Canada Post Corporation are 
government-owned entities.  
Company name ISIN code   Company name ISIN code 
AIR FRANCE-KLM FR0000031122   NESTLE SA CH0038863350 
ALCOA INCORPORATED US0138171014   NORSK HYDRO ASA NO0005052605 
ALTRIA GROUP INCO. US02209S1033   PEPSICO INCO. US7134481081 
AMERICA MOVIL SAB DE CV MXP001691015   PFIZER INCO. US7170811035 
ANGLO AMERICAN PLC. GB00B1XZS820   PPL CORP. US69351T1060 
ASTRAZENECA PLC. GB0009895292   PROGRESS EN.RES.CORP. CA74326Y1079 
BALFOUR BEATTY PLC. GB0000961622   RAYONIER INCO. US7549071030 
BASF SE DE000BASF111   RAYTHEON CO. US7551115071 
BAYER AG DE000BAY0017   REED ELSEVIER PLC. GB00B2B0DG97 
BP PLC. GB0007980591   ROCHE HOLDING AG CH0012032048 
BRITISH AMER.TOB.PLC. GB0002875804   ROYAL DUTCH SHELL GB00B03MLX29 
BT GROUP PLC. GB0030913577   SANOFI FR0000120578 
CHEVRON CORP. US1667641005   SAPPI LTD. ZAE000006284 
CIGNA CORP. US1255091092   SIEMENS AG DE0007236101 
CONSTELLATION BNS.INCO. US21036P1084   SKF AB SE0000108227 
DARTY PLC. GB0033040113   STAGECOACH GROUP PLC. GB00B6YTLS95 
DEUTSCHE POST AG DE0005552004   SYNGENTA AG CH0011037469 
E ON AG DE000ENAG999   TATA STEEL LTD. INE081A01012 
ELI LILLY & CO. US5324571083   TELSTRA CORPORATION LTD. AU000000TLS2 
ENTERGY CORP. US29364G1031   TESCO PLC. GB0008847096 
EXXON MOBIL CORP. US30231G1022   THE GOODYEAR TI.& RUB.CO US3825501014 
FIRSTENERGY CORP. US3379321074   THE MCGRAW-HILL COS.INCO US5806451093 
FLETCHER BUILDING LTD. NZFBUE0001S0   TRANSCAN.CORP. CA89353D1078 
FORD MOTOR CO. US3453708600   UNILEVER PLC. GB00B10RZP78 
HOLCIM LTD. CH0012214059   UNITED TECHS.CORP. US9130171096 
INFOSYS LTD. INE009A01021   URS CORP. US9032361076 
INTL.BUS.MCHS.CORP. US4592001014   US.STEEL CORP. US9129091081 
INTL.CONS.AIRL.GROUP SA ES0177542018   VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS US92343V1044 
JARDINE MTSN.HDG.LTD. BMG507361001   TELEFONOS DE MEXICO S.A.B DE C.V. n/a 
KONINKLIJKE DSM NL0000009827   HYDRO-QUEBEC n/a 
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LARSEN & TOUBRO LTD. INE018A01030   CANADA POST CORPORATION n/a 
NATIONAL GRID PLC. GB00B08SNH34       
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Table 3 The countries where submitter firms are listed.  
Market Freq. Percent Cum. 
AUSTRALIA 1 1.67 1.67 
CANADA 2 3.33 5 
FRANCE 2 3.33 8.33 
GERMANY 5 8.33 16.67 
HONG KONG 1 1.67 18.33 
INDIA 3 5.00 23.33 
MEXICO 1 1.67 25 
NETHERLANDS 1 1.67 26.67 
NEW ZEALAND 1 1.67 28.33 
NORWAY 1 1.67 30 
SOUTH AFRICA 1 1.67 31.67 
SPAIN 1 1.67 33.33 
SWEDEN 1 1.67 35 
SWITZERLAND 4 6.67 41.67 
UNITED KINGDOM 13 21.67 63.33 
UNITED STATES 22 36.67 100 





Table 4 Percentage level of agreement and the 
Cohen’s Kappa coefficient for the inter-rater 
agreement achieved by the two co-authors in the 
classification of submitter comment letters. 
Comment letters were classified as either in 
agreement or in disagreement with the proposals 
set out in the Exposure Draft questions examined 





 1 90.48 0.85 




Table 5 Descriptive statistics for the independent variables used in the analysis. The sample consists of 54 submitters and 1,348 control group firms, for which the 
data required to compute the independent variables was available. SIZE is calculated as the logarithmic transformation of total assets; F-SIZE is the logarithmic 
transformation of the fair value of pension plan assets; FREEFLOAT is calculated as the percentage number of shares available for trading after excluding strategic 
ownership; SPR is the difference between the long-term expected rate of return on pension plan assets and pension plan discount rate; UNR-LOSS is a dummy 
variable which takes the value of 1 if the firm has unrealized net pension actuarial losses and 0 otherwise; FS is pension plan funding status calculated as the fair 
value of pension plan assets scaled by pension projected benefit obligations; LEV is calculated as total debt scaled by total shareholders’ equity and ROA, return on 
assets, is computed as EBITDA scaled by total assets; the two dummy variables –  IFRS and USGAAP –take the value of 1 if the preparer follows IFRS or US 
GAAP respectively, and 0 otherwise. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% level. 
 
  All sample Submitter group Control group 
                                
Variable P25 Mean Median P75 
Std. 
Dev. P25 Mean Median P75 
Std. 
Dev. P25 Mean Median P75 
Std. 
Dev. 
SIZE 14.50 15.71 15.57 16.88 1.79 16.48 17.37 17.50 18.11 1.25 14.44 15.64 15.48 16.76 1.78 
F-SIZE 10.92 12.41 12.59 14.11 2.42 14.55 15.45 15.75 16.70 1.45 10.81 12.28 12.49 14.00 2.38 
FREEFLOAT 0.58 0.74 0.83 0.94 0.26 0.85 0.91 0.94 1.00 0.10 0.55 0.73 0.82 0.94 0.26 
SPR 0.10 0.86 0.90 1.70 1.15 0.66 1.39 1.38 2.10 0.88 0.06 0.84 0.85 1.70 1.15 
UNR-LOSS 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.42 
FS 0.65 0.75 0.79 0.90 0.25 0.71 0.80 0.82 0.89 0.12 0.64 0.75 0.79 0.91 0.26 
LEV 0.30 1.13 0.62 1.23 2.00 0.48 1.09 0.71 1.35 2.46 0.30 1.13 0.62 1.21 1.99 
ROA 0.05 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.09 0.08 0.13 0.12 0.17 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.10 
IFRS 0.00 0.51 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.56 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.51 1.00 1.00 0.50 
USGAAP 0.00 0.34 0.00 1.00 0.47 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.34 0.00 1.00 0.47 
                                
Observations 1,402         54         1,348         
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                                                                  Table 6 Results for independent t-tests for difference in mean 
between the submitter and control groups. The p-values are for two-
side t-tests. All variables are defined in Table 5. 
Variable 
Mean 




SIZE 17.37 15.64 1.73 0.0000 
F-SIZE 15.45 12.28 3.17 0.0000 
FREEFLOAT 0.91 0.73 0.18 0.0000 
SPR 1.39 0.84 0.55 0.0015 
UNR-LOSS 0.13 0.23 -0.10 0.0860 
FS 0.80 0.75 0.05 0.1651 
LEV 1.09 1.13 -0.04 0.8878 
ROA 0.13 0.10 0.02 0.0856 
IFRS 0.56 0.51 0.05 0.5016 
USGAAP 0.41 0.34 0.07 0.2991 
          
Observations 54 1,348     
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Table 7 The Pearson correlation matrix for the entire sample. The sample of 1,402 firms consists of 54 
submitters and 1,348 control group firms, for which the data required to compute the independent variables, 
are available. All variables are defined in Table 5. 
  SIZE F-SIZE FREEFLOAT SPR 
UNR-
LOSS FS LEV ROA IFRS USGAAP 
SIZE 1                   
                      
F-SIZE 0.6621 1                 
  0.0000                   
FREEFLOAT 0.2393 0.3576 1               
  0.0000 0.0000                 
SPR 0.2316 0.3501 0.2333 1             
  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000               
UNR-LOSS -0.0552 -0.0485 -0.1481 -0.1430 1           
  0.0388 0.0694 0.0000 0.0000             
FS 0.0783 0.3721 0.1577 0.1506 -0.0984 1         
  0.0034 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002           
LEV 0.2677 0.1307 -0.0229 -0.0037 0.0061 0.0109 1       
  0.0000 0.0000 0.3914 0.8903 0.8183 0.6823         
ROA -0.2475 -0.0881 -0.0410 0.0691 -0.0229 -0.0073 -0.1552 1     
  0.0000 0.0010 0.1248 0.0097 0.3908 0.7836 0.0000       
IFRS -0.1130 -0.0454 -0.1389 -0.3913 0.2002 -0.1001 0.0452 -0.1019 1   
  0.0000 0.0891 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0905 0.0001     
USGAAP 0.2203 0.2735 0.3195 0.5175 -0.3310 0.0653 -0.0321 0.0340 -0.7360 1 





Table 8 Results for the probit model testing H1. The sample 
consists of 1,402 firms: 54 submitters and 1,348 control group 
firms, for which the data required to compute the independent 
variables are available. SUB is a dummy variable, which takes 
the value of 1 if the firm submitted a comment letter, and 0 
otherwise. Marginal effects are the average partial effects of the 
explanatory variables on the probability of observing a 1 in the 
dependent variable. All variables are defined in Table 5.  
  SUB 
Variable Coefficient Z-statistic 
Marginal 
effects 
SIZE -0.05   -0.64 0.00 
F-SIZE 0.48 *** 5.95 0.03 
FREEFLOAT 1.22 ** 2.3 0.07 
SPR 0.15   1.4 0.01 
UNR-LOSS -0.32   -1.34 -0.02 
FS -0.82   -1.58 -0.05 
LEV -0.04   -1.17 0.00 
ROA 1.82 * 1.77 0.11 
IFRS -0.09   -0.23 -0.01 
USGAAP -0.55   -1.38 -0.03 
Constant -8.05 *** -7.33   
          
Observations 1,402       
Pseudo R-squared 0.315       
                           *  10% level of significance  
                              **  5% level of significance 





Table 9 Results for the probit model testing H2. The sample 
consists of the 46 submitters that answered Q1 of the Exposure 
Draft and for which data are available. Q1_AGRRE is a 
dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the firm agreed 
with the proposal set in Q1, and 0 otherwise. EQUITY is the 
percentage of pension plan assets allocated to equities. All 
other independent variables are defined in Table 5. Marginal 
effects are the average partial effects of the explanatory 
variables on the probability of observing a 1 in the dependent 
variable.  
  Pr (Q1_AGREE) 
Variable Coefficient Z-statistic 
Marginal 
effects 
SIZE 0.47   0.93 0.09 
F-SIZE -0.43   -0.94 -0.08 
FREEFLOAT 15.64 *** -2.76 -2.82 
SPR 0.12   0.23 -1.11 
UNR-LOSS -2.14 ** -2.15 1.62 
FS -6.17 * -1.81 0.02 
LEV 0.12   0.65 0.09 
ROA 8.97   1.46 0.02 
EQUITY 0.52   0.19 -0.37 
IFRS 5.09 * 1.77 0.70 
USGAAP 1.97   0.73 0.22 
Constant 13.22 ** 2.12   
          
Observations 46       
Pseudo R-squared 0.51       
*  10% level of significance  
**  5% level of significance 





Table 10 Results for the probit model testing H3. The 
sample consists of the 50 submitters that answered Q5 of the 
Exposure Draft and for which data are available. 
Q5_AGREE is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 
if the firm agreed with the proposal set in Q5, and 0 
otherwise. EQUITY is the percentage of pension plan assets 
allocated to equities. All other independent variables are  
defined in Table 5. Marginal effects are the average partial 
effect of the explanatory variables on the probability of 
observing a 1 in the dependent variable.  
  Q5_AGREE 
Variable Coefficient Z-statistic 
Marginal 
effects 
SIZE 0.75 * 1.66 0.13 
F-SIZE -0.70 * -1.83 -0.12 
FREEFLOAT -2.20   -0.58 -0.39 
SPR -0.93 * -1.83 0.04 
UNR_LOSS -1.27   -1.06 1.49 
FS 0.22   0.1 0.00 
LEV -0.02   -0.13 -0.68 
ROA 8.28   1.42 -0.17 
EQUITY -3.80   -1.05 -0.15 
IFRS 1.23   0.73 0.20 
USGAAP 2.05   0.94 0.37 
Constant -1.20   -0.25   
          
Observations 50       
Pseudo R-squared 0.264       
                               *  10% level of significance  
                                  **  5% level of significance 
                                  *** 1% level of significance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
